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1 Summary 
This document is an input to the ongoing strategic dialogue among stakeholders involved in 
organizing rice marketing in Zambezia, Mozambique. The input is based on original research 
under the DGISWUR programme Value Chains for Propoor Development presented and discussed 
during a strategic stakeholder dialogue organized in Maputo, February 7, 2011. The report 
addresses three straightforward questions central to a strategizing process: why, how and what. 
The overall problem addressed in this discussion is the lack of remunerative markets for small
scale rice farmers in irrigated and rainfed areas in Zambezia.  
 
The why question is approached by outlining two distinct, nonexclusive development pathways, or 
intervention logics, for organizing rice marketing: one based on institutionalizing a memberbased 
and profit sharing cooperative structure around the buying and marketing of rice, and one based 
on installing a buying function triggering a process of commercialization for members and non
members of the cooperative structure. These development pathways are not mutually exclusive, 
but entail different logics, which are important to clarify when strategizing.  
 
Our discussion on the how question focuses on processes of upscaling the buying of rice, in 
terms of volumes and involved numbers of rice farmers, and of embedding the process of 
commercialization in local capacities and organizations. The how question implies sketching a 
time path and documenting how the two distinguished logics take shape and interact in concrete 
change processes. We expect that both strategic development pathways, i.e. buying and 
organisation building, will interweave when working in processes of upscaling and embedding.  
 
The whatquestion brings the paper closer to immediate problemsolving and risk management 
activities, which reveals the navigating by different aligned stakeholders. Analysing the ways in 
which problems, such as managing debts of cooperatives, handling the buying process, or 
arranging access to tractors, are solved makes it possible to introduce more tactical and 
immediate actions into a strategic dialogue, without being overwhelmed by urgencies. The 
research experimented with an activitybasedcosting, with the aim to make transparent the 
relationship between first and second tier in the business set up. Likewise, research investigated 
how associated farmers learned how to solve problems on ownership and payments in the use of 
tractors for ploughing. Both investigations provided empirical information on how development 
logics manifest themselves in the different realities in Zambezia, which, hopefully, helps to 
continue an evidencebased dialogue.  
 
1.1 Acknowledgements 
This document is written by Sietze Vellema, Wouter Beekman and Bart Doorneweert. The 
research team also included Rolien Wiersinga, Sara Brune, Gert Jan Veldwish, Giel Ton, and Olga 
van der Valk of Wageningen UR. The strategic stakeholder meeting in Maputo was attended by 
Antonio Quinze (APAC), Pradeep Manikuttan (EOZ), Wim Verzijlenberg (RIAS), Wigle Vondeling 
(Banco Terra), Jeff de Jong (AUSTRALCOWI), Leo Stolk (Oxfam Novib), Sergio Ussaca (Royal 
Netherlands Embassy), Wouter Beekman (Resilience), and Sietze Vellema (Wageningen UR). Jan 
de Moor has played a vital role in linking the research team to the ongoing developments in the 
Zambezia rice sector. 
 
The views expressed in this document are the authors’ only. 
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2 Introduction 
The overall problem addressed in this discussion paper is the lack of remunerative markets for 
smallscale rice farmers in irrigated and rainfed areas in Zambezia. The intervention perspective 
focuses on measures that enable smallholder farmers to negotiate the terms of inclusion into 
value chains and that create conditions for commercialization of agricultural production. Two 
types of impact logics feature in this strategic dialogue. On the hand, there is an observed need 
to install mechanisms making linkages to market remunerative for farmers facing unpredictability 
and vulnerability in commercial transactions. On the other hand, there is an observed need to 
trigger basic processes of trade, buying and bulking, as a condition for farmers to make a 
decision to concentrate on rice farming and to sell their produce to buyers.  
 
The context for this discussion is provided by the process of implementing a 2tier cooperative 
model for the buying, processing and marketing of rice in Zambezia, Mozambique since 2009. 
Four 1st tier cooperatives, two of them with a longer history, have been responsible for bulking 
rice from smallholder producers. The 2nd tier cooperative, EOZ (Empreza Orizicola de Zambezia), 
is tasked to buy paddy, sometimes also directly from farmers, to process the rice in their factory, 
and to find national market outlets for processed rice, and, in that sense, to compete with 
imported (Asian) rice. The 2nd tier has also been instrumental in accessing credit from the bank, 
which was essential for arranging the work capital necessary for purchasing rice. The 
implementation of the cooperative business model is facilitated by the NGO APAC (Associação de 
Promoção de Agricultura Comercial), and the process is financially supported by the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy (RNE) in Mozambique, Oxfam Novib and the European Union. 
 
Wageningen UR was asked to investigate the workings of this 2tier cooperative business model in 
the context of Zambezia, with a history of struggles over land, violent conflict, unpredictable 
markets, irrigation schemes that require renovation, and a large number of farmers producing 
under rainfed conditions. The research focused on information flows related to the practice of 
buying rice, sourcing strategies of traders active in the area, the appreciation of farmers of the 
buying modalities, and the history of farmer management of tractors. The strategic dialogue 
combined insights in the inner working of an essential feature of the model, namely buying and 
bulking rice, with contextual features, particularly the history of farmers’ organisation and 
conditions in real markets. This informed the ongoing process of finding a strategic fit of the 2
tier cooperative business model with the diverse realities in Zambezia.  
 
The purpose of this document is to provide an evidencebased input to the ongoing strategic 
dialogue among stakeholders involved in organizing rice marketing in Zambezia, Mozambique. The 
input is based on original action research under the DGISWUR programme Value Chains for Pro
poor Development presented and discussed during a strategic stakeholder dialogue organized in 
Maputo, February 7, 2011 (Annex 1). The discussion paper neither pretends to offer an advice on 
what is best nor to offer organizational fixes for complicated problems. It aims to support those 
involved in the difficult process of making strategic choices in a context of uncertainty.  
 
The paper is structured around three straightforward questions, which any organization or 
stakeholder alliance must be able to answer to: the why, the how and the what: 
1. Why do EOZ, APAC and aligned stakeholders introduce a 2tier cooperative business 
model for achieving development outcomes, i.e. reduced poverty among rice farmers? 
2. How does the intervention model operate and develop? 
3. What actions are undertaken? 
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3 Why? 
The general starting point for the design of the 2tier cooperative business model was the 
observed lack of remunerative markets for farmers in Zambezia, Mozambique. The discussion 
focuses on organizational measures shaping economic realities, i.e. terms of trade and 
opportunities to buy and sell. The different stakeholders teaming up in this endeavour opted for a 
2tier cooperative business model, partly in response to the lack of scale and capacity to buy, 
process, and sell on of previous endeavours at 1st tier level. This begs the questions why it would 
be reasonable to expect a 2tier model to deliver desired development outcomes in the specific 
context of Zambezia? What is it about the 2tier model that changes the choices of rice farmers 
and enables them to shift to selling higher volumes of rice to the cooperatives? What resource(s) 
does it provide to enable / facilitate / support that shift? 
3.1 The rice market in Mozambique 
Consumption volumes of rice in Mozambique increased rapidly, while production volumes more or 
less stabilized in 1998 (Figure 1). Of all rice consumed only a quarter is produced in Mozambique 
itself: most rice in the Mozambican market is imported from Asia. Zambezia is the largest rice 
producing area in Mozambique. Nevertheless, the volumes transacted in the market are low. Our 
research shows that farmers bring manually processed rice to local markets, for example in 
cases of urgent cash needs. Small ambulant and medium traders buy relatively small quantities of 
processed rice or paddy, varying from 12 bags to 12 tons at a time, and there presence in the 
local market is unpredictable. Currently, mills are largely underutilized with utilization rates often 
below 20% of capacity. The limited supply by rice farmers reaching the market is a major 
disincentive to invest in milling. Due to small volumes of trade most mills limit their activity to the 
provision of milling services and refrain from getting involvement in procurement of rice. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Production and consumption of rice (milled) in Mozambique from 1960 to 2005 
Source: USDA PS&D Online downloaded from http://worldfood.apionet.or.jp/indexe.html 
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In this context, the 2tier model aims to install coordination mechanisms between buyers and 
sellers, which may enhance predictability in buying and reliability in pricesetting. And, accordingly, 
to increase volumes of locally sourced rice in the market and to encourage selling of rice by 
farmers. The current situation in the rice market results in low utilization of processing capacity 
and it entails risks for farmers exploring a shift to intense, commercial rice production. The 
intervention model is expected to induce new forms of coordination and buying modalities 
providing incentives for farmers to increase production and sell their paddy to the cooperatives. 
Setting up of cooperative structures is expected to ensure a fair remuneration of farmers.  
 
The involved chain actors are farmers, four 1st tier cooperatives, the 2nd tier cooperative, and 
traders. The farmers and the cooperatives are supported by service providers, in particular APAC, 
which set up programs with funds from national and international institutions. A relational diagram 
of the newly evolving rice chain model shows all major stakeholders in the new rice chain, 
including the flow of rice in 2009 (Figure 2). In 2010 no buying occurred and in 2011 the plan is 
to source through the 1st tiers. The four 1st tier cooperatives are member of the 2nd tier 
cooperative. The 1st tier cooperatives are supposed to supply paddy to the 2nd tier cooperative, 
which processes and markets the rice. Reasons for setting up the 2nd tier cooperative were to 
overcome management and financial problems faced by the two old 1st tier cooperatives, to 
achieve economy of scale, and to access credit lines necessary for the capital required in buying 
rice. The 2nd tier cooperative started buying rice in September 2009, and is in the process of 
constructing a new factory, for processing and storing paddy. Next to processing, the 2nd tier 
cooperative sells the processed rice at the factory gate, in a city shop, to traders and at national 
level to government functionaries. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Relational flow diagram of 2tier cooperative business model (2009) 
Source: Fieldwork interviews, 2010 
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In four districts in Zambezia (Namacura, Nante1, Nicoadala and Mopeia) within the potential scope 
of the 2tier cooperative business model almost 33,000 smallholder farmers are active in rice 
production (Table 1). Zambezia has large flood plain areas prone to flooding in the rainy season. 
The regular flooding and associated soils make rice production appropriate and prevents 
cultivation of other crops during this season. In the higher areas or near the households, farmers 
grow other crops such as maize, cassava, cashew, peanuts and fruits. Labour is a major 
constraint in agricultural production. For the discussion in this paper it is important to realize that 
outside of the few concentration areas around the irrigation schemes, rice production is 
fragmented due to the natural conditions in or near flooded areas.  Obviously, this complicates 
orchestrating the buying of rice.  
 
Table 1: Number of producers, cooperative membership and planted area in Zambezia rice sector 
 
2009 # producers # coop members percentage Total (ha) Rainfed 
Nantes  
(concentrated) 
11486 65 0.6% 4986 88% 
Nicoadal  
(distributed pockets) 
9971 125 1.3% 9971 96% 
Namacura  
(distributed pockets) 
8111 20 0.2% 6807 100% 
Mopeita  
(distributed pockets) 
2923 ? ? 1940 100% 
  32491 210 0.6% 23704   
 
Source: APAC 
 
3.2 Two distinct intervention logics: organization building and buying 
The above sets the scene for the implementation of a 2tier cooperative business model. Our 
discussion on the why question reflects on the purpose of this endeavour, namely to create a rice 
market in Zambezia that is favourable for farmers. We distinguish between two intervention logics 
visible in the actual functioning of the 2tier model.  
 
The first intervention logic centres strongly on constituting a memberowned, membercontrolled, 
and memberbenefitting cooperative procurement and marketing organization, where the number 
of members and the share of rice traded exclusively with members is a measure for success. This 
logic centres on building an organization in control of the terms of trade for rice farmers 
supplying the domestic market and with capacity to ensure reliable and predictable buying and fair 
and transparent remuneration by way of a cooperative model for profit sharing.  
 
The second intervention logic considers the EOZ business organization as a competitive trigger to 
the procurement market in the region, luring in the interest of other buyers, and providing 
producers with several competing marketing alternatives. Here success is measured more in 
terms of total traded rice volume, rather than on rice traded with members. The instalment of 
actual buying capacity for both members included in the cooperative business model and for non
                                              
1 In the district of Maganja da Costa, rice production is concentrated to the Administrative area of Nante. 
 6
member farmers alters the scope of the intervention to indiscriminative sourcing by a reliable 
buying organization. 
 
This translates into two nonmutually exclusive development pathways, which will probably 
configure differently over time. Plausibly, the initial phase of the development of the rice market 
requires a stronger effort to develop the operational function of the company. In this initial 
development phase, the installation of a procurement and marketing function would be the most 
tangible outcome of the intervention model. The current level of membership presented in Table 1 
indicates that the buying function at 1st tier level potentially reaches large numbers of farmers that 
are not necessarily member of the cooperative. In a later stage the focus can shift towards 
development of a variety of memberbased buying organizations linking to farmers and negotiating 
prices and trading conditions.  
 
The above does, however, not imply that the cooperative model approach is the preferred 
organizational fix under all circumstances. The suggestion of our discussion is rather that room 
should be created for progressive discovery, allowing the fitting model to emerge by consciously 
blending the two organizational and business development pathways into configurations fitting the 
conditions at production sites and in the market. This may also benefit a strategic stakeholder 
dialogue, by preventing the dialogue from becoming entrenched in opposing positions, with one 
side keeping strictly to the initial memberbase model and putting mechanisms in place that would 
enlarge the membership base, and the other side departing from the cooperative model 
altogether and aiming for market development in which EOZ functions as the provider of 
procurement and market services. An organizational model is always subject to change, either 
brought about internally or by external pressures, affecting the feasibility of the current, visible 
organizational form. Also members and nonmembers will assess and possibly try to change the 
current organisational setup and compare this option with feasible organizational alternatives or 
development pathways. Retaining a certain level of flexibility in its strategic outlook allows an 
organisation to tailor its functions and performance to actual conditions at farm level. Hence, it 
seems important to portray the 2tier cooperative business model as an evolving process 
combining different logics, rather than as a process working towards a fixed organizational 
outcome. The actual organisational form then emerges out of the interaction between the 
envisioned model and the translation of this into practice of buying and social organisation in 
different settings. Keeping an open eye for this iterative process may enhance strategic capacity 
to navigate in changeful conditions. 
 
The discussion on the whyquestions pivots around discovering the inner working of the 2tier 
cooperative business model. We present the 2tier cooperative business model in the rice market 
in Zambezia as an evolving combination of two pathways. One, as a successful development tool 
creating a membership based organisation, securing production, processing and selling through 
its members only. Two, as an intervention creating a market mechanism for all small holder 
farmers where the coop functions as a catalyser and a future security towards fair pricing, loyalty 
of buying and market influence that should stimulate farmers inclusion into the coop. A singular 
approach of working towards a fixed organizational outcome (the cooperative) seems to be highly 
risky. And it requires clearly mandated local leadership, which holds the natural capacity to 
facilitate organizational development towards the intended form. Our suggested dual approach 
relaxes some of the rigid demands to organizational form and aims to encourage learning about 
the ways in which a 2tier model moulds itself in to a workable form fit for the concrete socio
economic and agroecological conditions in rice production in Zambezia. 
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4 How? 
The previous discussion on two complementary development pathways links to the discussion on 
the howquestion. We propose to focus on two processes fundamental to building the business 
and cooperative structure. The first process entails upscaling of procurement capacity (i.e. 
business development), whereby EOZ and the 1st tier cooperatives have the ambition to prove 
itself as a pivot to the market. The second process concerns expansion of a membership base by 
including more farmers (i.e. organizational development), moving into other areas, or taking up 
other commodities in the trade portfolio, which raises the issues of trust and ownership. These 
two processes will put different demands on the functional requirements of the organization, and 
thus on the organizational form, and it will reveal ways in which the intervention model becomes 
embedded in local contexts. A focus on scaling and embedding helps to continue the discussion 
on how EOZ can combine a memberbased, member driven organization and a market based, 
farmer service driven organization. The ensuing question is how to organize the 2tier cooperative 
business model in such a manner that room is created for progressive model development 
4.1 Scaling procurement capacity 
The intervention model targets a movement from buying 1000 to 5000 tons of rice. This 
transformation links the scale of operation to deciding about appropriate forms of governance 
and procurement modalities. A diverse group of farmers spread over a large area makes up the 
entire sourcing base of paddy. This complicates procurement strategies at the level of the 1st tier 
operations and the 2nd tier transportation.  
 
If the 1st tier cooperative is expected to buy only from members, and accordingly install profit 
sharing mechanisms, then measures would be necessary to include new members in areas where 
production is fragmented. It may also require setting up a nucleus and networks with independent 
smaller units groups responsible for the buying procedures and rooted in villages. This method 
would demand new types of managerial capacities at 1st tier cooperatives. On the other hand, if 
the 1st cooperatives are primarily expected to buy rice, indiscriminative of membership, then 
enhanced logistic capacity and commercial skills are necessary for the managing board.  
 
Hence, upscaling the model in terms of actually purchased rice volumes can still be done in 
different ways. How scale and governance are related may be answered differently for irrigated 
areas where farmers are more concentrated and have experience with collective responsibility for 
water management compared to rainfed areas where farmers are more scattered and may have 
experience with organizing tractor ploughing in a fragmented group of rice farmers. In the latter 
case, the management strategy for aggregating volumes may involve competition structures 
between the different 1st tiers or even at a lower buying post level or rewarding mechanisms for 
good operations. Exploring different option informs a discussion on what steps can be taken to 
realize the 5.000 ton target and to examine within what time frame this will be realistic, especially 
because large volumes requires connections with a large number of different farmers in a vast 
area. 
4.2 Ownership and embedding 
In the current setup of the 2tier cooperative business model farmers are the owners, expected in 
holding the boards of the 1st tier accountable for the management, who as owners of the 2nd tier 
in turn should hold the board of the 2nd tier accountable. The board of the 2nd tier controls and 
directs the manager of the factory and procurement operations. This governance model is 
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generically implemented in all four sourcing areas. The 1st tiers cooperatives are considered to be 
responsible for divulgating the message and distribute expected benefits of the cooperative 
business model. The number of members is used as a key indicator for the success of the 2tier 
model.  
 
This model assumes a certain level of trust among members of the 1st tier cooperatives for 
handling problems and managing financial affairs and depends on accountability mechanisms 
between 1st and 2nd tier. Interviews and conversations with key players in the implementation of 
the 2tier cooperative business model indicate that communication and access to information 
were earmarked as central elements in making the model work. These informational aspects were 
also crucial in the practice of buying rice. Trust, or the lack thereof, was frequently mentioned as 
a key feature of the cooperative model that combines vertical coordination and horizontally 
organized joint action. In interviews, farmers voiced opinions that the lack of trust is related to 
outside control over management and the low level of commitment and reliability of appointed 
managers at 1st tier level. Experiences of the two older 1st cooperatives still resonate, and the 
debts left by managers who left the scheme hamper the expansion of the 2tier cooperative 
business model.  
 
One of the possible explanations for these types of tensions is that the 2tier cooperative was 
parachuted into rice producing areas and that no explicit connectivity with existing organizational 
forms was sought. What seems to have been absent from the implementation of the 2tier 
cooperative business model is a proactive search for variant grassroots organizations, whose 
experience with managing collective goods or joint action could be an asset for performance of 
the model and for enhancing ownership. Our investigation of the management of a tractor for 
ploughing reveals that farmers groups faced numerous problems with failing managers and abuse 
of available funds and payments. Likewise, the case study indicates incremental learning through 
continuous problem solving, which, eventually, led to a situation wherein small farmers groups in 
rainfed areas organized themselves to arrange an efficient use of a tractor in grouped fields, and 
to initiate service delivery by the manager of the tractor. Tapping into the capacities of these 
types of groups may strengthen the ownership and governance modalities of the 1st tier 
cooperatives by installing a clear distribution of tasks and responsibilities. Perceiving the 1st tier 
cooperatives as a central point in a network of connected smaller units may open new avenues 
for governance of buying and trading rice, of which the precise governance structure evolves out 
of performing tasks rather than out of a formal concepts of ownership. 
 
In the current situation, the ownership of the 2tier cooperative business model is ambiguous. 
Looking at the level of membership, a large portion of rice farmers was not owner of the 
intervention model and a sequence of events indicate that control and check mechanisms 
between 1st and 2nd tier were difficult to trigger. This is a reflection of the two distinct 
development pathways described in the previous section. If the 1st cooperative is instrumental for 
assembling new members willing to sell rice, this suggests shared ownership and responsibility 
and a focus of activities around members only. Or, as is the current situation, the 1st tier 
cooperative primarily performs a buying function, linking a small group of cooperative members to 
both the 2nd tier and a large number of nonmembers. This suggests a distribution of ownership 
between two organizational units and the necessity on the selection of communities or groups 
willing to sell or produce for achieving scale. 
 
Likewise, the appreciation of (potential) benefits for farmers differs. In the case of a member
based ownership model the economic benefits lie in sharing profits and in reducing costs for 
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trading as well as sharing the risk of operation (a plausible reason for many farmers not to 
become member). In the case of a 1st tier cooperative organized around the function of buying, 
the types of benefits expressed by several farmers in interviews come to the forefront: the 
cooperative buys all the different qualities of rice, the selling of paddy reduces the burden of 
processing by hand, the buyers of the cooperative treat farmers in a fair ways and do not trick 
them, and the cooperative announces that they will come back and also buy next year. These 
benefits and services are available to all rice farmers, member or nonmember: beneficiaries may 
opt to not be part of the system, while benefiting from the system. What is not perceived by most 
farmers is that these benefits only exist because there is a small group of members willing to take 
the responsibilities and risk of the 1st tier management. This is the classic freerider problem, 
which is found in cooperatives, where members and nonmembers enjoy the same benefits of the 
cooperative regardless of their affiliation. Such freeriding issues can become an immediate threat 
to the organization, if they are not adequately dealt with, as it they weaken relations between 
members and the cooperative. By making clear what benefits apply to members, and how they 
entail more than the benefits, which nonmembers receive, the most prominent freerider issues 
can be tackled. 
 
Also in this situation, managing and supporting the implementation of the 2tier cooperative 
business model is a balancing act between the realities wherein farmers make choices and 
manage risks and the conditions necessary for making the organizational model work. Opting 
purely for a memberbased cooperative model requires intense training and regulations on the 
institutional and legal implications of being a member, especially if it is true that most farmers 
essentially see the cooperative as a reliable buyer, as is suggested by interviews and stakeholder 
discussions. Opting for a 1st tier buying function may imply a regulatory framework on the basis of 
economic performance and financial transparency and accountability of a bounded buying unit, 
e.g. zero loss policy, while fostering the establishment of new entities with appropriate scales for 
inclusion into the cooperative. 
 
The strategic choices underlying the implementation of a 2tier cooperative business model come 
to the fore when looking at how the model functions. Here we centre on scaling and embedding 
the model. Depending whether one is opting for a membership model, the howquestion will focus 
on intensive workshops and training on rules and rights in cooperative organisations. A focus on 
an indiscriminative buying model shifts attention to sourcing and buying procedures at 1st tier level 
to reach farmer inclusion and to achieving loyalty after demonstration of success. 
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5 What? 
The previous two sections presented two distinct intervention logics and used these pathways to 
propose a number of considerations in two processes fundamental to the 2tier cooperative 
business model: upscaling of procurement capacity and embedding of the organizational model 
and ownership modalities in local forms of association. This section, on the ‘what’ question, 
discusses a selection of immediate actions brought forward in discussion with stakeholders and 
relevant for progressive discovery. 
 
Firstly there’s the practical problem of solving the debt. Secondly there is the action of compiling 
a procurement plan to operationalize the EOZ organization. Thirdly and lastly, there is the need for 
continuous learning and reflecting on the model, in order be able to make decisions at fitting 
times on the adapting the organization if it is required. 
5.1 Indebtedness 
The indebtedness of two 1st cooperatives is also an ownership issue: who are the actual owners 
of the debts, who takes responsibility and in what way can the problem be handled collectively 
(i.e. 1st and 2nd tier cooperatives as well as the wider coalition of stakeholders involved)? Two of 
the four 1st tiers have a longer history of mismanagement, related to the performance of a hired 
manager who was/could not be controlled by the board members or supporting institutions. In 
this situation, a substantial amount disappeared, and delayed amortization resulted in a 
substantial debt (a total debt of €200.000 remains the property of the two 1st tiers cooperatives). 
The debts affect the viability and liquidity options of EOZ. The indebtedness of two organizational 
owners of the 2nd tier cooperative turns this into a collective problem, because the current 
ownership structure makes EOZ vulnerable to future claims and limits willingness of banks to 
provide new loans or to maintain credit lines. This ownership problem has many layers: the old 1st 
tiers brought in debts but also assets (the current processing machines, warehouses, tractors), 
the new 1st tier cooperatives have neither debts nor assets, and the 2nd tier cooperative has 
occurred debts in the first year of operation and has no assets as all current investment is still 
property of the investors/donors.  
 
Considering the general commitment expressed by the involved stakeholders to solve this issue 
legally and practically, the actual problem solving can also be a starting point for addressing the 
more strategic issues examined in the previous sections and to work towards installing new 
accountability mechanisms or enforcement of defined financial bottom lines.  
5.2 Procurement practices 
The research team experimented with an information tool focused on Activity Based Costing. The 
idea was to collect information useful for managing the mutual dependent relation between initially 
1st and 2nd tier cooperatives. The relevance of longterm continuity, which was also mentioned by 
interviewed farmers as a key benefit, is a central principle herein. By taking a practical approach, 
the research team tried out an information tool computing costs at different layers in the 2tier 
cooperative business model. This was considered to be a way to enhance the transparency in 
discussion and exchange with the assumption that it may create trust as a side effect. The use of 
these types of tools in the context of concrete procurement practices may also affect the 
conditions of upscaling and embedding the 2tier cooperative business model and, subsequently, 
helps to further define the function of EOZ. By directing attention to procurement practices and 
the buying function our discussion suggests that building ownership and acceptance of new 
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governance modalities can be best done incrementally in relation to activities directly relevant to 
farmers. This allows correction and reconfiguration of the 2tier cooperative business model 
embedded in real practices and in interactions with grass root organizations as possible new 
nucleus sub groups of the 1st tiers willing to sell or produce for EOZ.  
 
It also taps in into the discussion of creating smaller subgroups beyond the 1st tier level, which 
can be targeted with different options for buyin. The assumption is that these smaller subgroups 
will strengthen the ownership structure and loyalty to EOZ combined with the use of trust 
remediating mechanisms present in communities or smaller groups. The tractor study 
demonstrates that farmer groups do grow in their management capacity and it could be argued 
that the more active involvement (resistance) of the two older 1st tier cooperatives is actually a 
demonstration of better capacity and understanding on what is happening.  
5.3 Learning by doing 
Our discussion on action, the ‘what’ question, suggests that central to making the 2tier model 
work is trial and error. In order to engage purposefully in the trial and error process it is relevant 
to document these processes of choice, control and correction and to find opportunities to make 
use of these insights and evidence in negotiation and conflict resolution. In the venture capital 
world a document collecting these pieces of evidence is labeled as term sheets, which are used 
when investments into a new business startup is negotiated. Although terms sheets are generally 
applied to negotiate on economic aspects to valuating and distributing ownership over a business, 
the principle of documenting actual problem solving practices can also be expanded to include 
issues relating to purpose and focus of the organizations. By starting a term sheet negotiation 
process, a document is created, which reveals in practical and empirical terms how ownership is 
arranged between various stakeholders, and how the division of responsibility affects the 
treatment of contingent event, like managing conflicts and financial risks and distributing shares 
or profits. Documenting problem solving processes and tracking the organizational dynamics may 
then become an asset in strategizing and responding to internal tensions and external pressures. 
In this way, answering the why and how question is done on the basis of concrete events. In this 
approach, making the 2tier model work is a matter of continuous configuring and investment, and 
a rolling document comparable with a term sheet can provide the institutional embedding of this 
process. 
 
The above also includes composing a time path, documenting instructive events, which is 
instrumental for reflecting on the two development pathways and the how questions on upscaling 
and embedding introduced above. Most likely, the two pathways and the strategic process will 
configure differently over time. The concrete organizational processes visible over time will show 
how both pathways combine and, for example, clarify benefits, costs and roles of members and 
nonmembers. It will inform with farmers and other stakeholder on different business cases and 
create room for choice and buyin into a pallet of business models. The assumption is that this 
would create better (adaptive) management at 1st tier level and enhance the transparency 
between 1st and 2nd tier levels. The proposed term sheets may center on procurement practices 
and investments by the involved stakeholders.  
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6 Conclusion 
The discussion in this paper addresses three questions related to making a 2tier cooperative 
business model work in the context of rice farming in Zambezia, Mozambique.The discussion 
shows making strategic questions and choices explicit is fundamental to planning and 
implementing concrete activities. However, a process of strategizing is easily hampered by day to 
day crises, requiring tactical responses, related, for example, to indebtedness and procurement. 
We hope that this paper encourages directly involved actors and other stakeholders to engage in 
an ongoing learning process focusing on why and how to implement the cooperative experiment. 
The context for such a learning process is provided by concrete actions, such as finding a 
resolution to the problem of indebtedness. Addressing such a problem can be used as a reset 
points to rules and regulations around accountability and financial bottom lines; and as a moment 
of reflection on strategic choices related to procurement practices and roles of the subgroups in 
the coop. Likewise, experimentation, for example with a Activity Based Costing and term sheets, 
can provide a basis for informed choice making about how to enhance trust and how to adjust the 
organisational model to the conditions in Zambezia. We conclude that all three questions  why, 
how, and what  are central in an iterative process combining the identification of intervention 
logics, the description of strategic processes, and the documentation of concrete actions and 
events. We suggest that such an iterative process opens opportunities for creating a fit between a 
promising intervention model and unpredictable realities in agricultural production and trade. 
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Annex 1: Presentation of research findings during strategic 
stakeholder dialogue (Maputo, February 7, 2011) 
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